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ard has been set as a determinant of either of these capacities. A truly
helpful test to fit all cases has not even been propounded. At best
the test of "capability to understand the particular transaction," used
by many courts, is a restatement of the problem in more definitive
terms or a narrowing of the issue. It is incorrect to state that either
contractual or testamentary capacity is greater or that they are the
same in all instances. It is also incorrect to assume that either of
the two capacities, once determined in a particular case, is applicable
in other wills or contracts made by the same person. Each case must
be decided on its own facts; reference to other cases gives only an
insight into the problem and an indication as to what the courts in
past cases have considered as having a bearing on the determination.
The courts seek to understand the mental state of the individual concerned and seem willing to consider anything that may clarify the
matter. They pronounce some evidence inconclusive and some inapplicable, but from it they formulate an estimate of the situation
and determine whether the contracting party or testator was competent or incompetent for the particular purpose.
Regardless of the indefiniteness of the formula, the courts seem to
reach plausible results in the many varied factual situations. This may
indicate that it is the feeling of the court derived from the facts of
the case that governs the outcome rather than strict adherence to any
formula or rule of law.
HARRY M.

SAWYER, JR.

COMPENSABILITY OF MENTAL ILLNESS UNDER THE
FLORIDA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
One way in which a stigmatizing myth is perpetuated is by legal
hostility toward compensability for mental illness unaccompanied by
physical trauma under workmen's compensation acts. This body of
law has, as has tort law, been reluctant to grant recovery for purely
"mental" or "nervous" disorders without a physical occurrence. This
occurrence may take the form of direct impact upon the body of a
claimant, resulting in emotional shock, or of tangible, "visible" injury caused by an emotional shock incurred during the course of
employment and proximately resulting from it.
There are other areas in which mental illness is viewed with
jaundiced skepticism. The composite result of this skepticism is a
social myopia that impedes the public awareness and understanding
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necessary for complete rehabilitation and community reacceptance of
people with histories of mental illness.
In spite of extensive publicity campaigns conducted by agencies
such as mental health foundations, which inform the public that
mental illness is just as "respectable" and curable as a physical illness,
social prejudice regarding mental maladies lingers in the public's subconsciousness. Frequently appearing on employment forms or licensing applications are blanks devoted to any history of mental illness
or psychiatric care. Often the blank requesting such information is
in juxtaposition to one devoted to the applicant's history, if any, of
venereal disease. It is not suggested that there is any sinister motivation in the preparation of these forms. It is rather a reflection of
public attitude in general. As long as mental disorders are viewed
with apprehension former mental patients will continue to be considered questionable risks in their prospective endeavors.
The effects of this subtle prejudice are manifested to some extent
in the field of workmen's compensation. Awards are frequently denied when all aspects of an accident upon which a claim is predicated
are mental in form. If the initial cause of a claimant's injury is
mental and the subsequent injury and disability are also mental,
many courts are reluctant to find that the claimant's plight resulted
from an "accident" within the course and scope of his employment.
That recoveries are granted in most cases when the "cause" is physical
and the "effect" is mental, and vice versa, serves even further to indicate the existence of prejudice. It is recognized that the difficulty
of eliciting proof to establish causation may be the reason for denial
of awards in "purely mental" cases. The persistent prerequisite that
a physical factor be present on which to base an award is evidence
that the courts indulge in this discrimination among labels to prevent
recoveries by malingerers. It is submitted, however, that mental
illness and malingering are often equated in the minds of some, including judges.
That the fact finding task is difficult does not justify a rule of law
that depends for its existence upon the label that is ascribed to a
particular set of facts. This note deals essentially with the Florida
attitude regarding compensability for mental illness. Primary concern
is devoted to Florida decisions involving compensability of mental
or emotional disorders under the Florida Workmen's Compensation
Law.' The applicable sections of the law are those defining injury,2
'FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1959).
2FLA. STAT. §440.02 (6) (1959): "The term 'injury' means personal injury or
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disability, 3 and accident.
To present properly the problem of compensation for mental
illness incurred in the course of employment, it is essential that dis-

cussion be devoted to various theories of recovery that are utilized

when compensation is awarded. The theories are broken down by
Larson 5 into four categories: (1) physical trauma causing nervous
injury, (2) mental stimulus causing physical injury, (3) mental
stimulus causing nervous injury, and (4) compensation neurosis.
PHYSICAL TRAUMA CAUSING NERVOUS INJURY

Nervous injury resulting from physical trauma is a universally accepted basis for compensating mental disorders. This is understandable, since the underlying theory approximates "impact" notions under the common law and thus causation is more readily apparent.
Compensation has been awarded a claimant who was incapacitated
by a "fear complex" brought on by a severe injury to her fingers
from operating a drill press.6 This fear complex rendered her incapable of doing any work involving the use of her fingers. Early
recognition was given to the fact that the nervous effects of an injury
can linger after the muscular effects have ceased.7 A neurotic whose
mental trouble stemmed from an accidental physical injury was also
held entitled to compensation." The Oklahoma court used an old
comprehensive term, neurasthenia, to classify the claimant's disorder,
death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases
or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury."
3FLA. STAT. §440.02 (9) (1959): "'Disability' means incapacity because of the
injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury."
4FLA. STAT. §440.02(19)
(1959): "'Accident' shall mean only an unexpected
or unusual event or result, happening suddenly. A mental or nervous injury due
to fright or excitement only or disability or death due to the accidental acceleration
or aggravation of a venereal disease or of a disease due to the habitual use of
alcohol or narcotic drugs, shall be deemed not to be an injury by accident arising
out of the employment. Where a pre-existing disease is accelerated or aggravated by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, only acceleration of death or the acceleration or aggravation of disability reasonably attributable to the accident shall be compensable." (Emphasis added.)
51 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§42.20-.24 (1952).
6

Imperial Knife Co. v. Calise, 80 R.I. 428, 97 A.2d 579 (1953).
7Eaves v. Blaenclydach Colliery Co., [1909] 2 K.B. 73 (1909).
SRialto Lead & Zinc Co. v. State Indus. Comm'n, 112 Okla. 101, 240 Pac. 96
(1925); see Annot., 44 A.L.R. 494 (1925).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1960

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1960], Art. 10
NOTES
pointing out, however, that the intervening neurasthenic condition
must be shown to have proximately resulted from the accidental
physical injury. Likewise, a paranoic condition found to have proximately resulted from a blow on the head was held compensableY A
recent Florida case upheld an award compensating "traumatic neurosis" suffered by a claimant after being struck on the head by an
eight-and-one-half ounce cardboard spool thrown by a fellow employee.' 0 The court stated that traumatic neurosis by definition was
an injury within the meaning of the statute. In arriving at its decision the court seemed to emphasize the fact of the blow. Part of
the distinction between this case and a prior one which disallowed
an award" lies in the fact that in this case a blow was received,
whereas in the previous case the claimant had received merely a jolt.
The common law impact theory of recovery is thus seemingly engrafted
on workmen's compensation law.
It can be conceded, however, that once "impact" or "trauma," at
least outwardly physical, is established, compensation will be awarded
practically everywhere, including Florida, for mental or emotional"
disorders proximately resulting therefrom. Those cases denying recovery on this ground usually do so because of insufficient proof to
establish causation or of conflicting medical testimony. 3
MENTAL STIMULUS CAUSING PHYSICAL INJURY

There is considerable authority for supporting compensation
awards when physical injury and disability result from a purely mental
stimulus experienced during the course of employment. Courts will
permit awards when injury or "impact" to the mind causes a distinct
physical disability.
Compensation has been awarded to a bus driver who suffered a
cerebral hemorrhage as a result of excitement caused by a minor colOFord Motor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 355 Ill. 490, 189 N.E. 498 (1934);
accord, Campana v. Hogan, 7 App. Div. 2d 815, 180 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (3d Dep't 1958);
Chicklowski v. Hotel Syracuse, 5 App. Div. 2d 704, 168 N.Y.S.2d 641 (3d Dep't
1957); Rodriguez v. New York Dock Co., 256 App. Div. 875, 9 N.Y.S.2d 264 (3d
Dep't 1939).
'0Watson v. Melman, Inc., 106 So. 2d 433 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
"City Ice and Fuel Div. v. Smith, 56 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1952).
l2No attempt has been made to distinguish the meaning of "mental" from
that of "emotional" or "nervous." For the sake of clarity these terms should be
lumped as non-physically manifested disorders.
"3See Quillen v. 0. D. Purington Co., 80 R.I. 165, 94 A.2d 247 (1953).
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lision, 14 to a cab driver who suffered a cerebral hemorrhage resulting
from nervousness brought on by observing a policeman forcibly arresting three men, 15 to an employee of a dry cleaner for a stroke
suffered after a berating by an irate customer, 1 6 and to the estate of
a trolley driver who died from coronary thrombosis brought on by
the severe mental strain and excitement of his employment.Y
Florida's workmen's compensation act excludes recovery for mental
or nervous injury caused only by fright or excitement. The language
of the act does not specifically preclude recovery for a physical injury
or disability caused by "fright" or "excitement." There are, however,
no reported Florida cases deciding this precise question. Superior
Mill Work v. Gabel' s held that there must be a physical injury upon
which to predicate a claim for a disabling neurosis. It is submitted
that the scope of the term physical injury, as therein used, is broad
enough to include "physical impact." The case involved an original
physical injury, but compensation was denied because it was not
shown that the subsequent neurosis proximately resulted therefrom.
This holding should be construed to mean that an initial physical
injury is required only if the disabling affliction is mental, emotional,
or nervous. In view of the general holding elsewhere and the nonexclusionary language of the statute, it should not be construed to
prohibit recovery when physical disability is the result of mental
impact. The few other Florida decisions allowing awards when the
mental factor was involved rested heavily on an initial physical "injury" or "impact" incurred in the course of employment upon which
to predicate liability for the subsequent physical or mental disability.' 9 None of these cases squarely decided that compensation
should or should not be granted for physical disorders resulting from
emotional disturbances. When an award is thought to be justified
the Court will find physical trauma or "impact" at the outset. In

14Reynolds v. Public Serv. Co-ordinated Transport, 21
A.2d 435 (App. Div. 1952).

N.J. Super. 528, 91

1SEagan's Case, 331 Mass. 11, 116 N.E.2d 844 (1954).
6Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
17McNees v. Cincinnati St. Ry., 90 Ohio App. 223, 101 N.E.2d 1 (1951); accord,
Wachsstock v. Skyviev Transportation Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 1028, 173 N.Y.S.2d 405
(3d Dep't 1958); Church v. Westchester County, 253 App. Div. 859, 1 N.Y.S.2d
581 (3d Dep't 1938).
1889 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1956).
19Lyng v. Rao, 72 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1954); Watson v. Melman, Inc., 106 So. 2d
433 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
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Lyng v. Rao 20 there was a finding of physical impact because lightning struck the building in which the claimant was working with
her feet on a wet floor. The effort to establish physical impact can
be explained in that the claimant was clearly disabled but her incapacitation was caused solely by mental strain.
Consistency in the opinions can be established only if the requirement of a physical injury, as in Superior Mill Work v. Gabel,
is limited to cases in which claims are predicated solely on mental
disorders. Since nothing in the statute expressly forbids compensation
for physical disabilities resulting from mental causes, Florida should
not disallow a claim based on such a fact pattern.
MENTAL STIMULUS CAUSING NERVOUS INJURY

When the initial injury or impact and the resulting disabling
21
disorder are both labeled mental, emotional, or nervous, some courts,
including Florida,2 2 do not recognize the disability as caused by an
"accident" within the meaning of the compensation acts. The issue
was faced squarely in a recent New York case 23 in which the claimant
cab driver suffered an emotional shock after striking a pedestrian
with his cab. Although the claimant was not harmed physically,
the shock exaggerated 2' a pre-existing emotional disorder, culminating
in paranoid schizophrenia. The court did not deny that the claimant
could be just as disabled as one suffering from a physical disability
but held as a matter of law that purely excessive emotions, unaccompanied by physical force or exertion, cannot be the basis of an
accident on which to predicate a compensable disability. It is inconsistent to regard an emotional shock as sufficient impact to establish causation for a disabling physical disorder2- but not to so
regard it for a mental one.
A 1955 Texas decision2 6 resolved this inconsistency. The claimant,
2072 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1954).
2lChernin v. Progress Serv. Co., infra note 23; Lewter v. Abercrombie Enterprises, 240 N.C. 399, 82 S.E.2d 410 (1954).
22City Ice and Fuel Div. v. Smith, 56 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1952).
23Chernin v. Progress Serv. Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 170, 192 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dep't
1959).
24Generally, aggravation or exaggeration of a pre-existing disorder, if resulting
from employment and otherwise compensable, is sufficient basis for an award.
25Wachsstock v. Skyview Transportation Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 1028, 173 N.Y.S.2d
405 (3dDep't 1958).
26Bailey v. American General Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955);
accord, Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
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an iron worker, had observed the death of a fellow workman in a fall
from a scaffold on which both were working. The claimant had
thought that he himself would be killed. The experience disrupted
his nervous system so that he was unable to perform the only work
for which he was trained, because it had to be carried on at considerable height. The Texas court tailored mental shock causing
nervous injury to fit a statute 27 defining injury as damage or harm to
the physical structure of the body. The court refused to limit the
definition of physical structure to bones and tissue but regarded it as
including the functioning of the entire organism. Since the claimant
had slipped himself and had been kept from falling by a cable, the
court could have found physical impact on which to peg its decision.
That this fact was bypassed indicates that psychic impact alone that
causes a purely mental disorder resulting in a claimant's disability
permits an award in Texas notwithstanding a statute seemingly requiring a physical occurrence. 2 It must be noted, however, that the
Texas court achieved this result by giving an identical meaning to
"psychic trauma" and physical injury.
Presumably, Florida could not achieve such a result by stretching
its statute, 29 since the express language precludes recovery for a nervous
injury caused by fright or excitement. It is submitted, however, that
were the facts of the Texas case presented to the Florida Court, the
same result would obtain but it would be based on a finding of physical impact. Florida has denied recovery to a trucker who sustained
nothing more physical than a jolt when his truck was sideswiped but
a day later suffered an emotional shock causing him to become disabled.3 0 There was considerable evidence that the emotional condition was caused by personal factors not connected with employment. Instead of basing its decision on the lack of causation, the
Court relied on the statute precluding recovery for mental disability
caused by fright or excitement. Had causation been more readily
apparent it is likely that the mere jolt would have been looked upon
as a physical impact, with no reference to fright or excitement. The
availability of reliable medical testimony and the responsibility of
the court to uncover the facts so that genuine compensable disabilities
do not go uncompensated make this discrimination among labels un27TEx. WORKMEN'S COMp. LAW art. 8306, §20

(1959).

Z8Accord, Peavy v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 40 So. 2d 505 (La. App.
1949).
298ee note 4 supra.
3oCity Ice and Fuel Div. v. Smith, 56 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1952).
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realistic. The resulting confusion can only obscure issues and make
the fact finding task more complicated.
COMPENSATION NEUROSIS

This form of mental disorder is usually temporarily disabling. The
afflicted claimant is rendered incapacitated by reason of apprehension
over the outcome of compensation litigation itself. Before compensation can be awarded for this malady, however, any required causation
and initial trauma tests must first be met. In theory, at least, this
neurosis should disappear when litigation terminates. 31 The award,
when granted, covers the period of disability caused by the compensation neurosis. One Florida case 32 is cited by Larson 33 as basing an
award on this ground. The claimant suffered an electric shock. Because of peculiar spiritual beliefs he thought that the shock was a
punishment from God and that only an award of total disability
would show that he had been given a heavenly pardon. Temporary
total disability was awarded, the Court noting, however, that although the claimant was suffering from a psychosis and not from a
neurosis, this particular manifestation would not have arisen but for
the electric shock received on the job. Decisions denying recovery
for compensation neurosis are often grounded on a break in the chain
4
of causation after the original injury.3
CONCLUSION

In Florida, mental disabilities resulting from physical impact, 35
and probably physical disabilities resulting from mental impact,36
are compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Law. However,
if both the cause and the result are labeled mental, compensation will
37
be denied.
It cannot be seriously doubted that in this highly competitive
world people often succumb to mental pressures resulting from their,
employment. If employment causes a mental condition or aggravates
3Hood v. Texas Indemnity Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.W.2d 345 (1948).
32Moses v. R. H. Wright & Son, Inc., 90 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1956).
331 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 5.
34E.g., Kowalski v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 116 Conn. 229, 164 Ad. 653 (1933);
Swift & Co. v. Ware, 186 S.E. 452 (Ga. App. 1936).
35Watson v. Melman, Inc., 106 So. 2d 433 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
36Superior Mill Work v. Gabel, 89 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1956).
37City Ice and Fuel Div. v. Smith, 56 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1952).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol13/iss3/10

8

Smalbein: Compensability of Mental Illness Under the Florida Workmen's Comp
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

a pre-existing one, there is no reason why a resulting mental disability
should go uncompensated notwithstanding the absence of an outwardly physical effect on the body. Denial of awards in these cases
thwart the whole purpose of workmen's compensation, which seemingly should be to compensate an employee for any debilitation of
his person resulting from employment. Actually there is no distinction between bodily and mental ills. In simple terms, the mind
is of necessity part of the body, separated only by metaphysical contemplation of such concepts as soul or psyche. Since the two are
thought separate by so many, however, they must, for the present, be
dealt with in that manner.
It is submitted that proper results can be achieved in compensation cases without discriminating among labels. Denials of compensation awards should be grounded on malingering if found as fact,
or on insufficient proof to establish causation, but not per se because
an employee receives an emotional shock or becomes mentally ill,
resulting in mental disability. That expanding recognition has been
given to mental disabilities is evidenced by the judicial treatment
accorded compensation neurosis, albeit there is a necessity for a
physical occurrence on which to base a recovery. If awards can be
based on this outwardly tenuous ground, it seems that the law
should go the second mile and permit awards for any mental injury
or disability resulting from employment, notwithstanding the absence
of a physical occurrence.
Mental or nervous injury resulting from fright or excitement is
listed in the statute, 38 along with disability caused by accidental acceleration or aggravation of venereal disease and conditions caused
by alcohol and drug addiction, as not constituting a compensable
injury by accident. As long as the statute is so worded, the stigma
attaching to mental ills from mental causes will remain glaringly
apparent. Florida courts, however, will continue to permit recoveries
in proper cases by finding a constructive physical impact to the person
when mental or emotional disorders are the disabling catalysts. Both
the stigma and the anomaly would be eliminated if the words "a
mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only . .. shall

be deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of the employment" 39 were removed from the statute.
PAUL W. SMALBEIN, JR.
8

3SSee note 4 supra.

3Dlbid.
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